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Abstract— This paper attempts to develop a graph-theoretic
multi-agent perspective of population games to study the
“truncation” behavior. The proposed method considers fitness
of the population as a dynamical system to address the issue
of restrictive description of this behavior which pertains to the
underlying population dynamic. The fitness dynamic resembles
an agreement protocol that enables comments on the steady-
state characteristics of the graph that represents the population
structure. The structural attributes of the underlying graph
and the truncation behavior are emphasized by exploiting the
spectral properties of the associated Laplacian matrix. The
asymptotic stability of the fitness agreement protocol has been
shown to be sufficient in concluding the stability of population
dynamics. Simulation results validating the proposed hypothesis
have been discussed.
I. INTRODUCTION
Evolutionary game theory has emerged from behavioral
ecology, a field that formally analyzes the influence of
ecological factors on the evolution of different species or
populations in their behavioral contexts. Their evolution
pertains to how they revise strategies under certain protocols.
The central idea of evolutionary games is to model the
evolution of the Nash equilibrium (NE) of strategic form
games using a set of differential equations that define the
strategy revision protocol. The population games belong
to a class of evolutionary games which model strategic
interactions among the populations with a key assumption
that these populations only occasionally receive opportunities
to revise their strategies. It is apropos to consider [1]–[5] for a
comprehensive literature survey on game theory. The literature
on evolutionary games, population games and various revision
protocols is spanned over last four decades [6]–[11]; surveying
this literature is beyond the scope of this paper.
A. Relevant literature
Population games have lately inspired a wide range of the
distributed optimization problem-solving techniques in multi-
agent systems. A decently recent work on the application
of these games to multi-agent systems includes [12]–[20].
An application of population games to a certain class of
cooperative control problems is demonstrated in [12]. Most of
the distributed optimization problems in multi-agent systems
can be pursued as dynamic resource allocation problems. To
this end, researchers have sought to exploit the distributed
version of a strategy revision protocol known as distributed
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replicator dynamic (DRD) [13]–[20]. The DRD overcomes
the drawback of classic replicator dynamic by considering
only local-level mutual interactions among the neighboring
agents. To elaborate further, [14] demonstrates the application
of the DRD to control the luminance of several lighting zones
with electrical power as a resource under consideration. A
similar but more appealing approach is considered in [15]
for optimal dispatch of distributed generators in a microgrid.
B. Motivation
Authors’ interest in the graph-theoretic analysis of popu-
lation games is motivated by observation of the “truncation”
behavior of agents [15]. The truncation behavior occurs when
the population-share associated with the agent has fitness
below the average fitness at equilibrium. The fitness may
be regarded as the payoff an agent receives for playing a
particular strategy [21]. If one considers a graph that depicts
the structure of a finite population in the game, then as the
population-shares associated with different agents undergo
strategy revisions, the interconnection structure of the graph
gets significantly influenced. For example, the population-
share associated with an agent, can render it fit or unfit for
survival, based on its strategy being profitable or nonprofitable
as observed by the revision protocol. [21]. This scenario is
theoretically explained in [15]. However, it appears that the
subject still lacks a detailed mathematical analysis.
In population games, an agent may refer to a strategy shared
by a subset of the total population. However, in context of the
reported work, it is referred to as the fitness associated with
the corresponding subset of the population. The population
dynamic (distributed replicator dynamic in this case) does
not describe the evolution of fitness of the agents. Hence it
is insufficient for understanding how the agents converge to
the agreement value. It only uses the fitness function as an
argument and describes the evolution of the population state.
As truncation is the behavior an agent may exhibit at a steady-
state, it is more appropriate to define the fitness dynamic to
understand how this behavior emerges. The proposed dynamic
describes the evolution of the fitness values. The approach
of the reported work provides a graph-theoretic explanation
to the truncation behavior of the agents with a few more
contributions stated below.
C. Contributions
The main objective of this paper is to seek an analytical
rationale of the “truncation” behavior of the agents using
spectral properties of the graph theory. To the best of authors’
knowledge, no significant contribution is seen towards ana-
lyzing this behavior in population games by exploiting rich
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spectral properties of the interaction graph of the game. The
contributions of the present work as follows:
1) The formulation of the fitness dynamic of the agents and
its realization as a linear parameter-varying dynamic
agreement protocol that allows analyzing these games
from the perspective of the multi-agent systems.
2) Analysis of truncation behavior of the agents using
spectral properties of the graph-Laplacian matrix.
3) A graph-theoretic approach to ensure the stability of
the Nash equilibrium of the potential games from a
graph-theoretic perspective.
D. Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Some
preliminaries on graph theory and potential games are
presented in Section II. Section III explains the network
model of the distributed replicator dynamic and the fitness
agreement protocol. The sufficient conditions for the existence
of solutions of the distributed replicator dynamic and the
fitness dynamic are presented in Subsection III-D. Subsection
III-E and Subsection III-H elaborate on the existence of Nash
equilibrium and its stability, respectively. Section IV presents
the simulation examples while Section V concludes the paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Graph theory
An (undirected) graph G is defined by the couple G =
(N , E) with n nodes (or agents) N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and a
number of edges in the set E ⊆ N × N . The neighbor
set of the ith node is Ni = {j ∈ N|(j, i) ∈ E}, where
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. The number of nodes n is the cardinality
of the graph.
B. Population games
A population game is characterized by a continuous vector-
valued payoff function f = (f1, . . . , fn) : <n+ → <n.
The agents of the population game choose their strategies
from a pure strategy set S = {1, 2, . . . , n} and their
aggregate behavior is described as a population state p(t) =
{p1(t), . . . , pn(t)} that belongs to a simplex 4 for all t ≥ 0
such that
4 = {p(t) ∈ <n+ :
n∑
i=1
pi(t) = Ptot}, (1)
where Ptot is the total population of the game [21]. For the
sake of notational simplicity, here onwards the dependence
on t is dropped wherever it is obvious. The scalar pi denotes
the number of agents choosing the pure strategy i and fi
denotes the payoff to strategy i.
Given a population game f , a Nash equilibrium p∗ of f
is defined as given below [20], [21]:
Definition 2.1: Given a population game f , the set of Nash
equilibria is defined as follows:
NE(f) = {p ∈ 4 : pi > 0 =⇒ fi(p) ≥ fj(p),
∀i, j ∈ S}. (2)
Fig. 1. An example of the interaction graph G(N , E) of a finite population
of the potential game f .
Further, f is a potential game if there exists a continuously
differentiable potential function V : <n+ → < such that
f(p) = ∇V (p). It is assumed that V (p) is strictly quadratic
concave, i.e. V (p) = −pTHp + bT p + c with H > 0. We
replace “payoff” by “fitness” throughout.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATION
This section first introduces the classic and distributed
versions of the replicator dynamic and proceeds towards the
problem formulation and main results of the paper.
A. Replicator dynamic
The replicator dynamic is a strategy revision protocol
which describes the aggregate behavior of the agents through
the evolution of the population state p(t). Assuming that
there exists a network of agents such that each agent
receives a certain share of the total population p, then the
classic replicator dynamic describes how the population-
shares associated with these agents vary with respect to time.
It is given by
p˙i(t) = pi(t) [fi(p(t))− f¯(p(t))], (3)
where the average fitness of the population is
f¯(p) =
1
Ptot
n∑
j=1
pjfj(pj). (4)
According to (3), the population-share associated with the
agent whose fitness is above the average fitness tends to
increase, while the population-share associated with the agent
whose fitness is below the average fitness tends to decrease.
Thus the total population stays constant.
B. Network model of distributed replicator dynamic
Let an undirected graph G = {N , E} depict a network of
agents as shown in the example of Fig. 1 such that each
agent has a nonzero population-share at t = 0, where N
denotes the set of agents and E denotes the set of edges of
the graph. Each agent in the network is characterized by the
population-share associated with it, which receives a certain
fitness for choosing a certain strategy. Henceforth, we allow
the fitness scalar to represent the agent wherever necessary.
The distributed version of the replicator dynamic (3) for the
agent is given by [20], [22]
p˙i =
∑
j∈Ni
pipj [fi(p)− fj(p)], (5)
where the difference of fitness between adjacent agents enters
into play.
Note that the simplex introduced in (1) remains invariant
under (3) and (5).
Introducing the Laplacian matrix L(p) of the graph, i.e.
L(p) =

li,j = −pipj ,∀(i, j) ∈ E ,
li,j = 0,∀(i, j) 6∈ E ,
li,i = −
∑
j∈Ni li,j ,
(6)
where |li,j | is treated as the weight of the edge connecting ith
and jth agents on the graph G. Below we write the dynamic
(5) in a stacked form as
p˙ = L(p)f(p) (7)
which represents the replicator dynamic of the population
state p(t). In view of its definition, the Laplacian L(p) is a
parameter-varying, real and symmetric matrix which is dif-
ferentiable and uniformly continuous in p. As a consequence,
the following holds.
Statement 1: There exists Λ > 0 such that the spectral
norm ‖L(p)‖ < Λ,∀p ∈ 4,∀t ≥ 0.
Statement 2: The gradient of L(p) with respect to p is
bounded above by some scalar η, ‖∇L(p)‖ ≤ η, p ∈ 4.
C. Fitness agreement protocol
The fitness dynamic of the population is derived from the
dynamic (7) as shown below,
f˙(p) = ∇f(p)p˙,
= ∇2V (p)p˙,
= −HL(p)f(p),
= −M(p)f(p), (8)
where M(p) = HL(p) is a positive semidefinite matrix, i.e.
M(p) ≥ 0 [see Theorem 2.2, [23]]. Notice that L(p)1n = 0
which implies M(p)1n = 0, where 1n ∈ <n×1 is a vector
containing all ones. That being the case the dynamic (8)
attains a steady state exactly when all fitnesses are equal.
Hence the fitness dynamic (8) resembles an agreement
protocol [24].
D. Existence and uniqueness of solution to fitness agreement
protocol
There exists a unique solution to the dynamic (7) [21]. The
Hessian matrix H is bounded because V (p) is continuously
differentiable and L(p) is also bounded. Consequently, the
fitness agreement protocol (8) has a unique solution.
E. Convergence of the DRD to the NE
The definition (2.1) straightforwardly extends to potential
games, however, for such games the NE is unique seeing that
the potential function V (p) is strictly quadratic concave.
The convergence of the population state p(t) to the NE
of the potential game may also be described from the graph-
theoretic perspectives. In what follows, we provide our main
results that link the graph theory with the population games
and show that the existence of the NE p∗ is strongly associated
with the connectedness of the interaction graph G.
F. Main results: Part A
Lemma 3.1: In the potential game f , all agents receive
equal fitness if and only if λ2(L(p(t))) > 0,∀t ≥ 0.
Proof: Since the edge-weights |li,j | are dynamic, for
the graph G to stay connected, one must ensure that li,j <
0,∀i, j ∈ E ,∀t ≥ 0. This condition can also be stated directly
in terms of the second smallest eigenvalue of L(p(t)) [24].
Assuming that G is initially connected, the necessary and
sufficient condition for G to stay connected throughout the
game play is that λ2(L(p(t))) > 0,∀t ≥ 0. λ2(L(p(t))) >
0,∀t ≥ 0 ensures that λ2(M(p(t))) > 0,∀t ≥ 0 since H > 0.
Hence, λ2(L(p(t))) > 0,∀t ≥ 0 is necessary and sufficient
to prove that the agreement protocol (8) converges to the
agreement value.
In line with the previous Lemma 3.1, we derive the next
result on the convergence of the dynamic given in (7) to the
NE of the game.
Theorem 3.2: If λ2(L(p(t))) > 0,∀t ≥ 0 then the fixed
point of the dynamic (7) coincides with the NE p∗.
Proof: Note λ2(L(p(t))) > 0,∀t ≥ 0 implies that
all edges have non-zero weights for all time. Since li,j =
−pi(t)pj(t), it further implies that the population-shares
associated with all agents remain non-zero (i.e pi(t) >
0,∀t > 0). Secondly, as a consequence of Lemma 3.1 and
the fact that M(p)1n = 0, the dynamic (7) reaches a fixed
point, say ps that qualifies to be the NE p∗ of the potential
game, as mentioned in Definition (2.1). Hence proved.
Lemma 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 provide the next corollary.
Corollary 3.3: The condition λ2(L(p(t))) > 0,∀t ≥ 0 is
a sufficient condition for the fixed point ps to be the NE p∗
of the potential game f .
A direct consequence of Corollary 3.3 provides the following
result.
Theorem 3.4: Let
σ0 = {λk(L(ps)) = 0,∀k = 2, . . . , n}
for ps 6= p∗, then σ0 6= ∅ indicates the existence of singleton
graphs.
Proof: It is obvious that |σ0| + 1 is the algebraic
multiplicity of the eigenvalue λ1(p) = 0, which is equal to the
number of connected components in G. If limt→∞ li,j = 0 for
some (i, j) ∈ E then there must be either limt→∞ pi = 0 or
limt→∞ pj = 0, or both; which indicates that the population-
share associated with either agent i or agent j, or both ith
and jth agents tend to decline. Let K be a set of such agents
then there must be |K| ≤ |σ0| number of isolated agents in
Fig. 2. Interaction graph G(N , E) from Fig. 1 depicting Case 3.1: Agent
f8 is an end-point.
Fig. 3. Interaction graph G(N , E) from Fig. 1 depicting Case 3.2: Agent
f4 is a cut-point.
the graph G. These isolated agents represent singleton graphs.
Hence proved.
G. Observations on truncation behavior of agents:
This subsection is in line with the truncation behavior
discussed in [15]. Here we introduce the singleton graphs
which lie at the center of the truncation phenomenon. Let
Gc ∈ K,∀c = 1, . . . , |K| be singleton graphs as defined
earlier. If fi(ps) is a fitness corresponding to the population-
share psi = 0 for some i ∈ N then we have two following
cases.
Case 3.1. When agent fi(ps) is an end-point of G(N , E):
The population-share psi = 0 implies that eventually li,j =
0,∀j ∈ Ni or Ni = ∅, following which Gc = {fi(ps)}. Since
fi(p
s) is being the end-point in G(N , E), its isolation renders
the connectedness of the remaining part of G unaffected i.e.,
as shown in the example of Fig. 2.
Case 3.2. When agent fi(ps) is the cut-point of G(N , E):
This scenario is depicted in Fig. 3, if the agent i holds the
position in G such that G′ ∩ G′′ = {fi(ps)} for any two
components, say G′, and G′′ in G; then the edges that have
isolated fi(ps) also separate G′ and G′′ from each other.
H. Stability analysis of dynamics (7) and (8)
Here we show that the stability of the fitness agreement
protocol (8) and the dynamic (7) share a common platform.
Before proceeding further, it is worth considering certain
notions of the dynamic (7) [11] stated subsequently.
1) Positive Correlation (PC):
p˙(t) 6= 0 =⇒ p˙(t)T f(p) > 0. (9)
2) Nash Stationarity (NS):
p˙(t) = 0⇐⇒ p ∈ NE(f). (10)
Conditions (9) and (10) strongly imply that the potential
function V (p) attains the maximum at p∗. The asymptotic
stability of the NE p∗ of the potential game is bound by
these conditions as stated in [11]. A similar approach has
been considered for the asymptotic stability of the distributed
replicator dynamic in [20]. The analysis considers that the
graph is connected. In essence, the stability analysis is
restricted to only p∗. However, it does not imply that the
distributed replicator dynamic has an unstable equilibrium
state when the graph loses the connectivity. In this scenario,
it is more convincing to analyze the stability of the fitness
agreement protocol (8) instead of the dynamic (7). In what
follows, we intend to prove that the stability of the fitness
agreement protocol (8) implies the stability of the dynamic
(7).
1) Main results: Part B:
Theorem 3.5: Let W (p) : <n × < → <≥0 be a
candidate Lyapunov function chosen such that W˙ (p) ≤
−λ2(L(p))fT (p)f(p) then the fitness agreement protocol
(8) is asymptotically stable.
Proof: Since H is a symmetric positive definite matrix,
it is invertible. Let the candidate Lyapunov function for the
system (8) be,
W (p) =
1
2
fT (p)H−1f(p). (11)
Differentiating (11) along the trajectories of the fitness vector
yields,
W˙ (p) = −fT (p)L(p)f(p). (12a)
Now, if the graph G remains connected ∀t ≥ 0, then we have
fT (p)L(p)f(p) ≥ λ2(L(p))fT (p)f(p).
Using this inequality in (12a), we get
W˙ (p) ≤ −λ2(L(p))fT (p)f(p). (13)
Hence proved.
Theorem 3.6: The asymptotic stability of the fitness dy-
namic (8) implies the asymptotic stability of the dynamic (7)
and vice versa.
Proof: The proof simply follows from the equation
(12a). We have,
W˙ (p) = −fT (p){L(p)f(p)}, (14a)
= −fT (p)p˙, (14b)
≤ 0. (14c)
Comparing the equation (14b) to the inequality (10), we
assert that the positive correlation holds between f t(p) and
p˙, and along with the condition λ2(L(p(t))) > 0,∀t ≥ 0, the
Nash stationarity also holds. Hence, the dynamic (7) is also
asymptotically stable. Hence proved.
Corollary 3.7: Every connected component in G exhibits
asymptotically stable dynamics.
Proof: If ps 6= p∗ then there exist |σ0| connected com-
ponents in G and each connected component, i.e. Gq, ∀q =
1, . . . , |σ0| has an associated Laplacian Lq(p); owing to which
the graph-Laplacian L(p) assumes a block diagonal form:
L(p) =

L1(p)
L2(p)
. . .
L|σ0|−1(p)
L|σ0|(p)
 .
(15)
Apparently, each connected component has a 0 eigenvalue
of algebraic multiplicity equal to 1. Also, each G has a subset
of agents having their population and fitness dynamics. In
line with this, the stability analyses discussed in Theorems
3.5 and 3.6 readily apply to the connected components in G.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
All simulations are performed using the MATLAB-
SIMULINK software. The population graphs are plotted
using “wgPlot.m” and “gplotwl.m” matlab routines. We first
consider a population dynamic of 5 agents. A simple nearest-
neighbor interconnection is considered as shown in Fig. 4.
Initially, the total population is equally distributed among all
agents (pi(0) = 0.2,∀i ∈ N ), owing to which all the edges
initially have equal weights as indicated by the blue color
associated with them. The vertical color map indicates the
weight associated with each agent i.e., the value of the fitness
scalar which is also correlated with the size of its dot. Initially,
the fitness scalar have been assigned different weights. As
fitness agreement protocol evolves, all fitness scalars except
f5 converge to the agreement value as can be seen from Fig.
5. It is due to the fact that the population state p5 belonging
to the 5th agent tends to decline and eventually goes to 0 as
shown in Fig. 6. This results in removal of the edges |l1,5|
and |l4,5| as reflected in Fig. 8. As a consequence of the
this, at a steady state, the graph G comprises two connected
components, i.e. the one that retains the agents f1 to f4 and
the other one being singleton graph that contains f5. Fig.
9 confirms the existence of 2 connected components in G.
The population structure at the steady state is manifested in
Fig. 10 wherein the edge-weights are associated with specific
color shades on the horizontal color map whose numeric
values are also indicated alongside the respective edges. Fig.
7 verifies that the simplex (1) remains invariant.
In a similar way, we also consider a random network of 20
agents as shown in Fig. 11. Initially, the total population is
equally distributed among all agents and the fitness scalars are
calculated to have different values. The connected components
in G are highlighted by boxed regions in Fig. 12, the graph
comprises 2 connected components and 9 isolated agents.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A macroscopic behavior of the distributed replicator
dynamic is analyzed using graph theory. The fitness dynamic
is shown to resemble a linear parameter-varying dynamic
agreement protocol. A comprehensive analysis of truncation
behavior in the distributed replicator dynamic is put forth
using spectral graph theory. It is proved that the existence and
asymptotic stability of the Nash equilibrium of the population
games are dependent on the eigenvalue spectrum of the graph-
Laplacian matrix of the underlying network. Also, it is shown
that with a right choice of a Lyapunov function for the
fitness dynamic; the asymptotic stability of the fitness dynamic
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implies the asymptotic stability of the distributed replicator
dynamic.
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